En the past 15 years, the banking industry has faced growing competition from other lii financial service firms and financial markers and, at the same time, has undergone subsnannial deregulation and change.
Proponents of further deregulation, such as the removal of barriers no nhe commingling of commercial and investment banking, argue that such changes would enhance the eff'mciency and viability of American banks.
The impact of competitive and regulatory changes on banks can be judged by gross measures of performance, such as profitability and failure rates. Economisns are also interested in how such changes affect the efficiency with which banks transform resources into various financial services. Inefficiency implies that resources are wasned, that is, that firms are producing less than the feasible level of output from the resources employed, or are using relatively costly combinations of resources no produce a particular mix of products or services, Thus, a goal of policymakers, as well as stockholders and managers, is to devise policies than improve the efficiency of commercial banks.
linforrunately, economists do not agree upon the appropriate methodology for measuring the efficiency of banks, Several estimation techniques have been proposed, each with advantages and disadvantages. The problem is complicated by the myriad of different services that commercial banks perform. Researchers deal winh complex issues in measuring bank production: Is a deposit an input no the production process, or an output? Should outputs he measured in terms of the number of a bank's accounts, the number of transactions it processes or the dollar amounts of Its loans or deposits? Perhaps non surprisingly estimates of commercial bank inefficiency vary considerably across studies that use different techniques, conceptions of bank production and data samples.
This article investigates the sensitivity of efficiency measures no broadly different conceptions of how banks operate. We use a single-esnimanion technique and a common pooi of banks to compare efficiency measures based on alnernanive views of bank production. We find substantial differences in mean efficiency across models and low, though statistically significant, correspondence in the rankings of banks by efficiency scores across models.
First, we discuss why measuring commercial bank efficiency is useful, some alternative measures of efficiency and techniques for estimating efficiency A description of the approach we take, our data and our results follow.
WHY DO WE CARE ABOUT THE EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS?
The performance of firms is often described in terms of their efficiency The measured efficiency of a production unit (a firm or plant) is generically interpreted as the difference between ins observed inpun and output levels and the corresponding optimal values. An output-oriented measure of efficiency compares observed output with the maximum output possible for given input levels. Alternatively an input-oriented FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS DIEYI1J efficiency measure compares the observed level of inputs with the minimum input that could produce the observed level of output. These are measures of technical efficiency and as such ignore the behavioral goals of the firm.
Measures of allocanive efficiency compare the observed mix of inputs or outputs with the optimal mix that would minimize cost, maximize profit or obtain any other behavioral goal. Allocative efficiency can be combined with technical efficiency no measure overall efficiency. In addition, measures of technical efficiency can be used to construct measures of scale efficiency which involve comparison of observed and optimal scale, or size, of the firm. One can also measure scope efficiency which involves comparison of the cost of producing nhe observed mix of outputs in a single firm with the costs that would prevail if each output was produced in a separate firm. Researchers have found that banks suffer more from technical inefficiency than from scale or scope inefficiency (for example, Berger and Humphrey, 1991) .
The efficiency of commercial banks is important for at least two reasons, First, efficiency measures are indicators of success, by which the performance of individual banks, and the industry as a whole, can he gauged. Banks face growing competition, both from other banks and from firms and markets outside the industry (see Wheelock, 1993) , and presumably banks will he more successful in maintaining their business if they operate efficiently Berger and Humphrey (1992) find that during the 1980s high-cost banks experienced higher rates of failure than more efficient banks. Similarly in a study of bank failures during the 1920s, Wheelock and Wilson (1995) find that the less technically efficient a bank was, the greater its likelihood of failure.
A second reason no investigate the efficiency of commercial banks is the potential impact of government policies on efficiency One might gauge the impact of a regulatory change by measuring its effect on commercial bank efficiency or examine efficiency among banks in different states no measure the effect of differences in branching restrictions or other regulations. Recent proposals to end nhe Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking stem in part from a view than broader powers could enhance the efficiency of banks and other financial institutions. Obviously this change could enhance the scope efficiency of banks if there are complementarities in nhe production of coonmercial and invesnment banking services. Conceivably such change could also improve scale or overall efficiency Improved efficiency is also one argument made in support of interstate branching and, indeed, Grabowski, Rangan and Rezvanian (1993) find that branch banking organizations are more efficient than multiple-office bank holding companies.
Other studies have considered whether bank mergers enhance efficiency Using different approaches, Rhodes (1993) finds that mergers have not generally improved efficiency though Fixler and Zieschang (1993) conclude the opposite. Shaffer (1993) , on the ocher hand, evaluates potential mergers and concludes that they could significantly reduce inefficiency for many banks of less than $10 billion of assets.
The impact of ownership or management structure on efficiency has also been studied. Pi and Timme (1993) , for example, find than banks whose chief executive officer also serves as hoard chairman are less efficient than other banks, and Mester (1993) shows that mutual savings and loan associations are more efficient than stock S&Ls,
ME'ASUR.INO COMMER,CI,AL BANK EFI-ICIENCY
The efficiency of commercial banks has been studied using a variety of techniques and samples, and, as noted above, has been used to address numerous policy issues. Recent studies typically use techniques than accommodate the multiple outputs of banks and measure the efficiency of individual banks relative to a standard set by peer institutions. Readers interested in a survey of this research can refer to Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) .
To date, no technique for measuring efficiency has been generally accepted and different methodologies appear to generate
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ULY/AUGUST 1995 considerable differences in measured efficiency even when common bank samples are used, Variants of four techniques are common in the literature. The "stochastic cost frontier" approach is an economenric methodology in which deviations of a firm's actual cost from predicted cost are presumed no be due no random error and inefficiency each of which is assumed no have a particular statistical distribution (usually the normal distribution for the random error and a halfnormal for inefficiency). The "thick frontier" approach is a variant in which deviations from predicted cost within the lowest average cost quartile of banks are assumed due no random error, and the differences between the predicted costs of banks in the highest and Lowest quartiles are assumed to he due no inefficiency The 'distribution-free" approach is applicable when data for more than one year are available. It assumes that inefficiency is stable over time, while random errors average out over time. 'rhat is, a bank's inefficiency for a span of years is taken to he the mean of ins measured inefficiency across all years within the period. Finally "Dana Fnvebopment Analysis" (DEA) is a non-parametric methodology in which linear programming is used no measure the distance of individual banks from the efficient, or "best-practice," frontier, All deviations from the efficient frontier are assumed to be due to inefficiency
Researchers have found that esnianates of inefficiency are sensitive to the choice of technique. Ferrier and L.ovell (1990) , for example, apply the snochasnic cost frontier and DEA techniques no a common sample of banks and arrive at different esnimates of inefficiency Berger (1993) finds substantial differences in measured efficiency from two variants of the distribution-free approach.
A second reason why different studies of commercial hank efficiency often reach seemingly contradictory findings might stem from differences in how a banking firm is modeled, Regardless of which of the four measurement techniques is used, the researcher must specify a list of inputs and outputs. The question, "What do banks produce?" is non simple to answer, Banks provide a variety of services, from loans and deposit accounts to trust services, safe deposit box rentals, mutual fund sales and foreign exchange transactions. Moreover, changes in regulation, technology and customer demands have caused the types of services that banks perform no change over time, For example, banks now provide a variety of securities-related services, such as underwriting and mutual fund sales, which regulators fi)rbid a few years ago. To tractably measure efficiency researchers are forced to begin winh simplified models of the banking firm, Unreliable estimates of efficiency can stem from the use of models than omit key features of hank production.
Some researchers view banks as prodntcers of loans and deposit accounts, and measure output by either the nutnher of transactions or accounts serviced, This view is referred to as the "production" approach. Others argue that a bank's output should be measured in terms of the dollar volume of loans or deposits it provides, a view known as the "innermediation" approach. Most studies of inefficiency use the intermediation approach, in part because the necessary data are more readily obtained. We are aware of only one recent study taking the production approach (Ferrier and Lovell. 1990) , though in the 1970s and early 1980s such studies were more common (see Gilbert, 1984) . The production approach focuses on operating costs and ignores interest expense. The intermediation approach, on the other hand, includes both operating and interest expenses, and hence may be of more interest for studying the viability of banks (see Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey, 1987; or Ferrier and Lovell, 1990) . For analysis of the operating efficiency of banks.., however, the production approach may be of interest.
Among those who use the intermediation approach are researchers who hold the view that banks produce various loans and other investments from deposits, other funding sources, labor and materials, This "asset" approach has been criticized because in ignores the fact that banks expend considerable resources supplying transactions and savings deposits (Berger and Humphrey 1992) .
Some researchers apply empirical criteria to determine what services to consider as bank outputs and what to consider as inputs. Berger and Humphrey (1992) , for exaanple. classify activities for which banks create high added value, such as loans, demand deposits and time and savings deposits as important outputs, with labor, physical capital and purchased funds classified as inputs. Alternatively Aly Grahowski. Pasurka and Rangan (1990) , I'lancock (1991) and Fixler and Zieschang (1993) adopt a "user-cost" framework, whereby a hank asset is classified as an output if the financial return on the asset exceeds the opportunity cost of the investment, and a liability is classified as an output if the financial cost of the liability is less than ins opportunity cost. Even though their details differ, the two approaches empirically tend to suggest similar classifications of inputs and outputs. The main exception is classification of demand deposits as an output in most user-cost studies, and as both an input and an output when the value-added approach is used (see Berger and Humphrey 1992, for more detail). Table I summarizes six recent studies of commercial bank production efficiency Although representative, this list is far from exhaustive, These studies employ a variety of estimation techniques and include a variety of different inputs and outputs in modeling the banking firm, The studies typically report inefficiency measures by hank-size grouping and for more than one type of inefficiency though for brevity we report just the mean overall inefficiency The reported percentages indicate the extent no \vhich the average hank overused inputs to produce a given level of output. Thus, the 35 percent inefficiency found by Aly and others (1990) indicates that the average hank could have produced the same level of output with just 65 percent of the input levels actually used. Measured inefficiency clearly varies with estimation technique, model specification and, probably the sample of banks used by the researcher.
In the retnainder of this article, we investigate the extent to which measures of efficiency and the rankings of individual banks depend on whether the intermediation approach or production approach is employed. Because we are interested in the impact of the approach taken on measured efficiency we use a single technique-DEA-----applied to a common pool of banks. Our findings might, of course, be different if we used another technique or sample, bun the purpose of this article is to investigate how sensitive efficiency measures are to the model of bank production employed.
MZW?OOLCOY
We trace our measures of efficiency to the work of Dehreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) . Boles (1966) was one of the first no use Linear programming methods no measure eflicicncy in production using their ideas. Other extensions have collectively come to he named Data Fnvelopment Analysis (DEA), a term coined by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) . LovelI (1993) summarizes this Iineaanure.
Details about the efficiency oneasures used in this article are contained in the shaded insert on page 6. The essential ideas, however, are illustrated in Figure 1 , which considers the case of a sample of firms producing a single output from two inputs, x 1 and x,. Suppose firms A, B and C each produce a given Level of output; A and B lie on the production frotonier XX', while C lies in the interior of the production set. The frontier XX' is the sen of all conahinations of input.s which can produce the same level of output, and where the reduction of at least one input necessarily causes output to fall. Hence, firms A and B are regarded as efficient, whereas firm C is regarded as inefficient. Inefficient firms such as C may lie in the interior of the production set due to imperfect information, managerial incompetence or perhaps other reasons, For firm C, inpun weak technical efficiency (IWE) is defined as the ratio of distances OC'IOC in Figure 1 . By reducing the input quantities used by firm Chy this amount, the firm could move to point C' and would be considered efficient in the IWF sense.
Next, we define input overall efficiency (bE). In terms of Figure 1 , the isocosn line is given by PP'. For firm C, the LOE score is given by the ratio of distances OC"IOC, Although the point C" lies outside the production set boundary andL hence is not feasi- federal funds pur hased, time deposits over S 100,000, foreign deposits and other harrowed fund includes inefficiencies due to excessive deposit interest paid and purchased fund intere t paid.
input treated as 'quasi-fixed,' that is, not variablein the short run. fed kinds sold securities bald, secunties and atlwr assets in froding account.
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as umptoon that the fi m i operating at In t rm of Frgu 1 albocatove efficoenc con tant retu n to scale with IWF obtaoned fo form C given by th ratio of distances pr 'vlousby. A co of unit> tmpboe that OC"/OC'. Albocatiẽ inefficiency arm e from the firm o operating under con t nt returns. easily into a specific percentage deviation from constant returns, the scores are useful for ranking firms by the extent of their inefficiency Each of the efficiency scores described above measures efficiency in an input orientation; efficiency is measured by holding output fixed anti determining the maximum feasible reduction in inputs. Efficiency can also he measured by holding inputs fixed and determining the maximum feasible expansion of outputs. Since the efficiency measures we use do not imply underlying assumptions regarding the behavior of firms, the choice between input and output orientations is somewhat arbitrary; one might compute both types of efficiency measures to get more information than can he obtained from either the input or output orientations alone. Note that both IWE and LOE are radial measures of efficiency that is, in each case efficiency is measured along a ray emanaung from the origin and passing through the firm in input-output space. Consequently, the efficiency scores are independent of the units of measurement used for both inputs and outputs, which is advantageous since units of measurement may always be defined arbitrarily Fare and others (1985) information about their operations and costs which are not generally available for banks, and which are necessary to measure efficiency using the production approach. After eliminating observations with missing values and observations for depository institutions other than commercial banks, data for 269 banks remain.
Because participation in the ECA program is voluntary, the banks in our sample may not be representative of the industry as a whole. For example, whereas the aver- age total assets at the end of 1993 for ECA program banks was $163.6 million, with a range from ff8.0 million no $2,602.8 million, average total assets were S300.7 million, with a range from 51.0 nuLhon to S108,223.0 million, for all U.S. commercial banks (as reported in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Reports of Condition, than is, the "Call Reports"). The average return on assets of 1.15 percent for the banks in our sample, however, was approximately the same as the average for all banks (1.12 percent). Nevertheless, because our sample of banks is not random, the efficiency measures calculated here should not be interpreted as reflecting the efficiency of commercial banks ito general.
For the production approach to modeling hank activities, we construct variables using definitions from Ferrier and 1_ovell (1990) In addition. Kaparakis and others also define quasi-fixed input, non-interest bearing deposits, for which there is no corresponding price. Other studies adopting the intermediation approach have ignored this item, as \ve do in the results reported below. Including non-interest bearing deposits as a fifth input when measuring technical or scale efficiency seems to have little effect on the results.
To form a specification midway between the production approach represented by the Ferrier and Love!! (1990) specification and the intermediation approach represented by the Kaparakis and others (1994) specification, we define yi,,y as the dollar amount of each account or loan corresponding to y,,...,y>, respectively. Because outputs are now measured in dollar amounts, this model is best classified as representing the intermediation approach, even though the choice of variables is based on Ferrier and Lovell (1990) . In addition, we define an alternative price system, w~,w~, w~, for the Ferrier and Lovell specification, where mtç = w,, and w~and w are computed similarly to w, and w 3 except that level of deposits is replaced by the number of time and demand deposits.
This seems to us to make the mapping of inputs and outputs under the production approach more consistent. We report summary statistics for each of the variables in Table 2 .
RESULTS OF EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT
We compute the various efficiency measures for the five models summarized below: Pt~~Pi Models 1 and 2 correspond to the Ferrier and Lovell (1990) specification, with alternative price definitions. Models 3 and 4 provide a bridge to the intermediation approach by replacing the number of accounts and loans in the output variables with dollar amounts. Model Sis the Kaparakis and others (1994) specification. Table 3 presents the mean scores for each type of efficiency described in the preceding section. Nole that since the samne inputs and outputs are used in models I and 2, and models 3 and 4, the technical and scale efficiency scores are the same for these models. For each efficiency measure, Table 3 also shows the standard deviation of the scores across the 269 banks in the sample, the number of banks having an efficiency score of unity (labeled "Number Efficient"), that is, the number of banks operating on the efficient frontier, as well as 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals for the mean. Given the large number of banks with efficiency scores of unity, particularly in the case of technical efficiency, and since all of the efficiency scores are defined to lie between zero and I, the underlying distributions of the individlual efficiency scores are clearly non-normal. Results from Atkinson and Wilson (1995) , however, suggest that our sample size of 269 is easily large enough for us to rely on the asymptotic normality of the sample means implied by the central limit theorem, and thus to compute confidence intervals based on a normal distribution.
Input
In several cases, the confidence intervals for the means reported in Table 3 We test for significant differences among the means of each efficiency measure across different models. At the 0.05 significance level, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis 0 f equivalent means in the following cases: (I) scale efficiency for models 3,4 and 5; (2) allocative efficiency for models 1 and 5, and models 3 and 5 (we do reject the null hypothesis when comparing allocative efficiency among models 1 and 3); and (3) overall efficiency for models I and 4. In all other instances, we reject the null hypothesis of no difference. Even the seemingly innocuous modification of redefining the input prices between models 1 and 2, and between 3 and 4 has a large effect on mean allocative and overall efficiency Note also that for the most extreme comparison, models 1 (the production view) and 5 (the intermediation view), we reject the null hypothesis of equal levels of technical and overall efficiency This suggests than, at least for this sample of banks, average efficiency does depend on the view of bank production assumed by the researcher. We find that average technical and overall efficiency is higher under the intermediation approach (model 5) than under the production approach (model 1). Our finding for overall inefficiency of 37 percent using models is similar to what Aly and others (1990) found for their sample, though substantially greater than what Kaparakis and others (1994) found for theirs (see Table 1 ).
It is possible to deternmine whether a particular bank lies on the increasing (IRS), constant (CR5) or decreasing (DRS) returns portion of the technology Table 4 Table 4 , we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference for models 3,4 and 5, and for models 1,2 and 3, 4. Each of the three tests fail to reject at the 90 percent level.
In the case of models 1,2 and 5, we reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the proportions at greater than 99 percent. Thus, while we find evidence of similarity in terms of returns-to-scale when comparing models 3, 4 with either models 1, 2 or 5, models 1, 2 and 5 appear different in terms of returns-no-scale. Nore banks appear to be operating under constant returns-to-scale when the intermediation approach is taken (mode! 5) than when the production approach is used (model I). Since returns-to-scale at a given location on the production frontier depend upon the shape of the variablereturns technology these results indicate that the technology implicitly esnimaned by models 3, 4 is simnilar to the technologies implied by models 1. 2 and 5, which in turn are significantly different. This is consistent with our view of models 3,4 as a bridge between the production approach represented by models 1, 2 and the intermediation approach represented by model 5. The result also suggests that differences between the two approaches might he due not only to use of number of accounts and loans versus dollar amounts, bun also to the treatment of time deposits as an output or an input.
In addition to comparing mnean efficiency scores, we use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, a sign nest for equality of medians and Kendall's i-statistic to further examine the similarity of efficiency scores across the five models. We report the results of these tests in Table 53 The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signedranks test analyzes the equality of distributions without making assumptions regarding the form the distributions might take. The values shown in parentheses in the second column of Table 5 give the two-tailed normal probabilities associated with the test statistic. Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of identical distributions when comparing scale efficiency scores from models 3, 4 and 5, when comparing allocative efficiency scores from models 1 and 5. and from models 3 and 5, and when comnparing overall efficiency scores from models I and 4. In all other cases, we reject the null hypothesis.
Returns to Scale
It appears than, for the most part, the distributions of the various efficiency scores do vary across models.
The sign test for equivalence of medians yields a two-tailed binomial probability which we also report in Table 5 . In only two instances do we not reject the null hypothesis of equal medians: when comparing scale efficiency scores from models 3, 4 and 5, and when comparing allocative efficiency scores from models 3 and 5. These results are consistent with our finding that, in most cases, average efficiency varies across models.
Finally, rather than comparing the distributions of efficiency scores from different models, we use the scores to rank banks in terms of their estimated efficiency Kendall's 'u-statistic measures the correlation among the ranks of banks from two models and provides a statistical test of the null hypothesis of no association between two sets of Since we one using on input onientotion, we could ufso exowine whethen inefficient books would lie on the indleosing-, constanton decmeosing-netemns pottioe of the technology ifinputs were propoctionotefy contracted to wove the honk to the frontier. Howeveç since the polio honk wight octuolly take to mend the fwntier ii the sources of inefficiency wont nemoved depends upon behoviumol goois, we ignore technically inefficient honks here.
Details on these cowpototoos woy be found i n the Syoto Reference -l) where N gives the number of observations.
By definition, the statistic lies between -l and +1, taking a value of +1 if rankings are in complete agreement, or-i if the ranks are completely reversed. Kendall and Gibbons (1990) suggest that the 'u-statistic may also be viewed as a measure of concordance. Any two pairs of ranks (u 1 ,v,) and (u 3 , vi The last column of Table 5 gives the i-statistic for the various pairs of models for each measure of efficiency along with significance levels as shown in parentheses. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no association among ranks in only live instances when comparing allocative efficiency scores. (In particular, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for the following pairs of models: 1, 2; 2,3; 2, 5; 3,4; and 3,5, and in only one case when comparing overall efficiency scores-for models 2 and 5). In all other cases, we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation.
None, however, that when we reject the null hypothesis of no association, the u-statistic is usually rather small in absolute terms; the largest value of the statistic shown in Table 5 is 0.5874 (in the case of overall efficiency for onodels 1 and 2). As is typical in classical hypothesis testing, rejection of the null hypothesis does not necessarily imply acceptance of an alternative hypothesis. That is, our statistical test may reject the hypothesis that the rankings are not associated, but that does non necessarily imply that the rankings are associated-the test is simply not that powerful. Figure 2 plots the rankings of overall efficiency scores for model 1 against those for model 5. None that the value of Kendallis 'u-statistic for this comparison is significantly different from zero an the 0.0012 level, indicating that the two sets of rankings are not discordant. The lo\v value of the test statistic (0.1329), however, suggests that mleither are the)' concordant.
Our results based on the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and the sign test for equivalence of medians are consistent with our observations on the differences of mean efficiency scores across the modeLs discussed earlier. Taken together, our results indicate that different model specifications are likely no produce different measures of the level of inefficiency among a sample of banks, hut not necessarily dissimilar rankings of individual banks in tenns of measured efficiency For our data, the rankings are similar enough to reject the : null hypothesis of no association, but in many cases are far from being in complete concordance. Concordance is relatively high for the technical and scale efficiency measures, which do not rely on price data. The introduction of price data to measure allocanive and overall efficiency might also introduce more sources of noise or error.
Rankings of Overall
CONCLUSSON
l,ike other studies of commercial hank efficiency, we find considerable inefficiency among hanks in our sample. Other studies have found suhscantial variation in efficiency measures in applying different estimation techniques no a common pool of banks. We find that measured efficiency also depends on the researcher's conception of what banks do. In this article, we measure various types of production efficiency under two very different views of banking. We find that, on average, technical and overall efficiency is higher under the intermediation view of the banking firm than under the production view. Mean allocative efficiency is, however, similar Under the intermediation view, we also find somewhat less scale inefficiency and more hanks operating on the constant-returns portion of the efficient frontier. Despite the differences in mean measured efficiency across the different conceptions of how banks operate, however, we find some similarity in the rankings of efficiency scores of individual banks. Further research will, of course, be necessary to determine how sensitive these findings are to the particular dataset and estimation techniques employed in this article.
